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We study the advantages to be gained in quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols
by combining the techniques of local randomization, or noisy preprocessing, and struc-
tured (nonrandom) block codes. Extending the results of [Smith, Renes, and Smolin,
quant-ph/0607018] pertaining to BB84, we improve the best-known lower bound on the
error rate for the 6-state protocol from 14.11% for local randomization alone to at least
14.59%. Additionally, we also study the effects of iterating the combined preprocess-
ing scheme and find further improvements to the BB84 protocol already at small block
lengths.
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1 Introduction
Using a quantum channel to create a secret key between two parties is closely related to using
the channel to send quantum information, with many results found in one area applicable in
the other. For instance, by treating the steps in a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol
coherently and viewing the entire process as an entanglement distillation scheme, one can use
properties of random quantum error-correcting codes to prove the security of the BB84 [1]
and 6-state [2] protocols up to bit error rates of pmax = 11.0028% [3] and pmax = 12.6193%
[4], respectively. Conversely, the formula for the quantum channel capacity can be obtained
by importing the key rate resulting from a general approach to secret key generation over a
known channel [5, 6, 7].
One of the surprising results related to quantum capacity is the non-optimality of random
codes, in contrast to the classical case. The classical capacity of a channel can be achieved by
using randomly-constructed block codes, and the independence of one input to the channel
from the next results in a so-called single-letter formula for the capacity. Random coding can
be used to create quantum error-correcting codes as well, but these do not always achieve the
capacity. Better performance can be achieved by structured codes which exploit the ability
of quantum error-correcting codes to correct errors without precisely identifying them, a
property called degeneracy. Initial results on rates achievable with degenerate codes displayed
only modest gains [8, 9], but recent analysis shows that degeneracy is crucial to the behavior
of optimal codes [10].
By appealing to the coherent formulation of the protocol, degenerate codes should also
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be useful in QKD. This was shown to be the case in the original security proof of the 6-
state protocol [4], as the results of [9] were used to improve the error rate threshold to
pmax = 12.6904%. More striking threshold improvements are possible, if counterintuitive,
by simply adding noise to the raw key bits before they are processed into the final key, a
procedure known as local randomization [11, 12]. This improves the error rate thresholds for
the two protocols to pmax = 12.4120% and pmax = 14.1119%, respectively. At first glance,
these results make no sense in the coherent picture of QKD, since adding more noise to
already noisy entangled pairs only decreases the amount of pure entanglement which can be
extracted. The entanglement/secret-key analogy does not hold perfectly, however; entangled
states are sufficient, but not necessary, for creation of secret keys. A broader class of states,
called private states, lead to secret keys when measured [13], and these should properly be the
target output of the coherent version of the QKD protocol. Indeed, the exact error thresholds
are recovered in the coherent picture when the QKD protocols with local randomization are
analyzed in these terms [14].
With a systematic understanding of how degenerate codes and local randomization boost
the key rate, it becomes sensible to combine the two methods to look for even higher thresh-
olds. Recently it was shown in [15] that doing so improves the error threshold of the BB84
protocol up to at least pmax ≈ 12.92% by using the same type of structured code studied
in [8, 9, 10]. These specific codes consist of the concatenation of two codes, the first a sim-
ple repetition code and the second a random code. The repetition code, sometimes called a
cat code in the context of quantum information theory since the codewords are |0〉⊗m and
|1〉⊗m, induces degeneracy in the overall code since a phase flip on any of the physical qubits
leads to the same logical error, and is corrected in the same way. In particular, blocklength
m = 400 corresponds to the threshold stated above. Since the random code portion of the
protocol corresponds to information reconciliation and privacy amplification in the classical
view, the local randomization and the repetition code together become a type of preprocess-
ing performed before these “usual” steps. In this paper we show that the same preprocessing
protocol as used in [15] can also be used to improve the maximum tolerable bit error rate
for the 6-state protocol, up to at least pmax = 14.5930% for a blocksize of m = 300. This is
already quite close to the upper bound of 14.6447% [16, 11, 17] on the tolerable error rate
for the BB84 protocol, and since the error threshold grows with blocklength, the bound is
presumably exceeded at larger blocklengths, indicating the higher robustness of the 6-state
protocol. In addition we investigate iterating the preprocessing scheme in the BB84 protocol,
and show an improvement both in rate and error threshold over single-round preprocessing
for even modest blocklengths. Our calculations are facilitated by a closer look at the repre-
sentation theory relevant to describing the quantum states resulting from the preprocessing,
enabling us to continue the investigation started in [15] to the 6-state protocol and iterated
versions of the preprocessing for BB84.
To begin, section II describes the preprocessing scheme in more depth and then derives
secret key rate expressions for the BB84 and the 6-state protocols. Numerical calculations for
blocklengths into the hundreds are then presented for the two protocols. Section III examines
the advantages of iterating the preprocessing protocol to achieve higher rates and thresholds
for the same amount of effort in noise addition and block coding. The appendix explains how
representation theory is helpful for the numerical evaluation of such key rates in both cases.
Author(s) . . . 3
50 100 150 200 250
11.8
12.4
13
13.6
14.2
14.8
p m
a
x
(m
)/
%
m
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
q(
m
)
qBB84
q6state
Fig. 1. Maximum tolerable bit error rate pmax (left y-axis, black) and the corresponding rate q
of the added noise for which it is achieved (right y-axis, blue) versus block length m. Dashed lines
correspond to the BB84 protocol, solid lines to the 6-state protocol.
2 Secure key rates using the preprocessing protocol
The preprocessing protocol proposed in [15] begins after Bob has received the quantum sig-
nals from Alice and they have sifted their raw keys to throw out mismatches between the
preparation and measurement basis. Alice then flips each of her sifted key bits (x1, . . . , xn)
with probability q, resulting in new bits (x˜1, . . . , x˜n). These are partitioned into blocks of
size m, and for each block she computes the syndrome (x˜1 ⊕ x˜2, x˜1 ⊕ x˜3, . . . , x˜1 ⊕ x˜m) and
sends this information to Bob. He computes the relative syndrome of their blocks by adding
his corresponding syndrome to Alice’s, modulo two. Alice’s message is public knowledge, but
the first bit of each block is still secret, so it is kept as a potential key bit. The protocol then
proceeds with the usual error correction and privacy amplification steps to transform these
kept bits into a secret key, now aided by the relative syndrome of each block and knowledge
of the probability q of local randomization. Without local randomization, it turns out that
m = 5 is the optimal blocklength for improving the error threshold in the 6-state protocol—
longer blocklengths have worse thresholds [4]. However, the results in [15] indicate that with
the addition of noise, the highest tolerable bit error rate of BB84 grows with the blocksize m,
and we find a similar result in the 6-state case (see figure 1).
We determine the secure key rates of the BB84 and 6-state one-way key distillation proto-
cols involving the preprocessing protocol described above using the security proof of Renner
[18]. This proof states that the key rate of such a protocol is given by
r =
1
m
min
σAB∈Γ
(
S(X |E)− S(X |Y )) (1)
where the minimum ranges over the set of states Γ of all density operators on the 2×2 dimen-
sional Hilbert space HA ⊗ HB such that the measurement performed during the parameter
estimation phase of the protocol leads to a certain bit error rate p. The conditional von
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Neumann entropies in (1) are calculated for the states
σXYE = EXYE←AmBmEm(σ⊗mABE) (2)
which describe the processing of each block, including local randomization and syndrome
calculation, and eventual measurement of the output qubits of the repetition code. That is,
the preprocessing is treated quantum-mechanically or coherently, but the usual processing
classically. Here X denotes Alice’s key outcome when measuring the output bits and Y Bob’s
key and syndrome outcomes.
For the BB84 protocol the set Γ contains the states
σAB =
∑
u,v
puvX
u
BZ
v
B|Φ+〉〈Φ+|ZvBXuB, (3)
where |Φ+〉AB = 1√2
∑
k |kk〉AB and {puv} ≡ {p00, p10, p11, p01} = {1− 2p+ t, p− t, t, p− t},
t ∈ [0, p]. In the 6-state protocol, meanwhile, parameter estimation assures us that Γ contains
only the single state σAB with {puv} = {1− 32p, p2 , p2 , p2}.
Using Renner’s proof allows us to include the preprocessing but still only minimize over
the quantum states σ corresponding to individual signals. The crucial simplification is that
the quantum state of the block can be taken to be the product σ⊗m without loss of generality.
Other proof techniques would require minimization over all possible (potentially-entangled)
block states, or an additional step in the parameter estimation procedure to ensure that the
state does have this power form.
2.1 Computation of the secure key rate
To compute the secure key rates we make use of the fact that the difference of entropies in (1)
can also be written as difference of corresponding quantum mutual informations, i. e. S(X |E)−
S(X |Y ) = I(X : Y )− I(X : E). In order to calculate these quantities, we need to determine
the states σXYE defined in (2). Start with an m-fold tensor product of a purification of σAB ,
|σ〉ABE ≡ |σ〉⊗mABE1E2 =
∑
~u,~v
√
p~u,~vX
~u
BZ
~v
B, |Φ+〉⊗mAB |~u〉E1 |~v〉E2 , (4)
where ~u,~v ∈ {0, 1}m = Fm so that X~u = Xu1 ⊗Xu2 ⊗ · · · , and similarly for Z~v and p~u,~v. We
now need to calculate the state resulting from noisy preprocessing followed by a blockwise
stabilizer code measurement in which the stabilizers contain Pauli 1 and Z operators only.
The first step, local randomization, can be described in a coherent way by adding a
classical register A′ (such systems will be denoted with boldface type) in the state ((1 −
q)|0〉〈0|+ q|1〉〈1|)⊗m and then applying controlled not gates from the individual register states
to the bits A. This leads to
|σ′〉ABE =
∑
~u,~v, ~f
√
p~u,~vq~fX
~u+~f
B Z
~v
B|Φ+〉⊗mAB |~f〉A′ |~u〉E1Z
~f
E2
|~v〉E2 , (5)
where ~f ∈ Fm and q~f = qf (1− q)m−f for f = |~f |, the number of 1s in ~f , a notation we shall
use throughout. Here we have used the fact that XA|Φ+〉AB = XB|Φ+〉AB to simplify the
expression; this move is responsible for the Z
~f operation applied to E2.
Author(s) . . . 5
In the second step, Alice and Bob both measure the m− 1 (generators of the) stabilizers
of a 1/Z-only stabilizer code which encodes one logical qubit into m physical qubits. Using a
public (authenticated) channel, Alice sends her syndrome to Bob who calculates the relative
syndrome ~s by adding Alice’s string to his measurement outcome modulo two. Afterwards
both decode their encoded state. Such a stabilizer code together with an encoding Uenc|~e, c〉 =
|θ(~e, c)〉, where
|θ(~e, c)〉 = |c · ~ηm +
∑m−1
j=1 ej · ~ηj〉, (6)
can be fully specified by defining two bases {~ξi}i=1...m and {~ηj}j=1...m both spanning Fm
with the property that ~ξi · ~ηj = δij (see e. g. [19]). In this case the stabilizers are given by
Z(~ξi) = Z
~ξi , i = 1 . . .m− 1, and a measurement of these stabilizers on the encoded state (6)
will give the syndrome ~e. Measurement of the logical Z operator Z(~ξm) gives the value of
the encoded bit c. Applying one of the X(~ηi) = X
~ηi , i = 1 . . .m− 1, operators on a encoded
state results in a flip of the i-th bit of the syndrome, while applying the logical X operator
X(~ηm) flips the encoded bit, c 7→ c⊕ 1. Both the set of all Z(~ξi) and the set of all X(~ηj) are
complete sets of commuting observables. Note that (i)
|Φ+〉⊗mAB =
1√
2m−1
∑
~e
1√
2
∑
c
|θ(~e, c)〉A|θ(~e, c)〉B, (7)
and (ii) that any m fold Pauli operator can be decomposed as
X~uZ~v = X
~ξm·~u(~ηm)Z~ηm·~v(~ξm)
m−1∏
i=1
X
~ξi·~u(~ηi)Z~ηi·~v(~ξi), (8)
where ~ξm · ~u and ~ηm · ~v are the logical bit and phase flip errors resulting when this Pauli
operator is applied to an encoded state like (6). In other words, the maximally-entangled
state of m physical qubits is the equal superposition of a logical maximally-entangled state
in all the possible encodings, which can be seen using the completeness of ~ηi. Meanwhile, the
formulation of physical X and Z operators in terms of their logical versions follows from using
the orthogonality of the ~ηi and ~ξj . Using these two facts we find that, after Bob’s calculation
of the relative syndrome ~s, the tripartite state can be expressed as (up to a local unitary
acting only on Eve’s systems)
|σ′′〉ABE =
∑
~u,~v, ~f
√
p~u,~vq~fX
~ξm·(~u+~f)
B Z
~ηm·~v
B |Φ+〉AB|~f〉A′ |~u〉E1Z
~f
E2
|~v〉E2 |~s〉B′ , (9)
where ~s = (~ξ1 · (~u+ ~f), . . . , ~ξm−1 · (~u+ ~f)). While the registers A and B in equation (5) have
been m-qubit registers, here they contain only a single qubit each. Alice missing (m − 1)-
qubits have been traced out since they contained only classical information about her absolute
syndrome (accessible to all parties). The rest of Bob’s m-qubit register now contains classical
information about the relative syndrome ~s and is labeled B′. We now restrict ourselves to
the cat code, which is given by (~ξi)j = δ1j + δi+1,j for i = 1 . . .m − 1, (~ξm)j = δ1j and
(~ηi)j = δi+1,j for i = 1 . . .m− 1, (~ηm)j = 1 (see figure 2). The name comes from the fact that
α|θ(~0, 0)〉+ β|θ(~0, 1)〉 = α|00 . . . 0〉+ β|11 . . . 1〉, a Schro¨dinger cat state when α = β = 1√
2
.
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Fig. 2. Cat code encoding one qubit into m = 4. The operators on the left hand side are the
Z(~ξi) = Z
~ξi (i = 1 . . . m from top to bottom), those on the right hand side the X(~ηi) = X~ηi .
The (generators of the) stabilizers are within the dotted line, the (generators of the) normalizers
within the dashed one.
Finally, Alice and Bob both measure their key bit. Alice forgets about which bits she
flipped by tracing out the A′ register. The correlations between Alice, Bob, and Eve are
described by the following semiclassical state:
σXY E =
1
2
∑
x
[x]A ⊗
∑
~u,~f
∑
~v1,~v2
√
p~u,~v1p~u,~v2q~f [x+
~ξm · (~u+ ~f)]B
⊗ [~s]B′ ⊗ [~u]E1 ⊗ (Z~ηm)xE2Z
~f
E2
|~v1〉〈~v2|Z ~fE2(Z~ηm)xE2 , (10)
where [x]B = |x〉〈x|B, etc. Note that the state is diagonal in E1 since the quantities ~ξi ·(~u+ ~f)
are all classical: i = 1, . . . ,m− 1 is already classical in (9), i = m became classical after the
key bit measurements by Alice and Bob. The {~ξi}i=1,...m span Fm thereby completely fixing
the string ~u+ ~f .
To calculate the quantum mutual information between Alice and Bob we trace out Eve
and obtain
σXY =
1
2
∑
x
[x]A ⊗
∑
~u,~f
p~uq~f [x+
~ξm · (~u+ ~f)]B ⊗ [(~ξ1 · (~u + ~f), . . . )]B′
=
1
2
∑
x
[x]A ⊗
∑
~u
p˜~u [x+ ~ξm · ~u]B ⊗ [(~ξ1 · ~u, ~ξ2 · ~u, . . . )]B′
=
1
2
∑
x
[x]A ⊗
∑
lx,~s
P˜ (lx, ~s)[x+ lx]B ⊗ [~s]B′ , (11)
where p˜ = p(1 − q) + (1 − p)q, p˜~u is defined as p˜~u = p˜u(1 − p˜)m−u, and P˜ (lx, ~s) = (p˜s(1 −
p˜)m−s)1−lx(p˜m−s(1 − p˜)s)lx . In the last step we used ~u = lx~ηm +
∑
i si~ηi to write the sum
over ~u as a sum over lx and ~s, where lx is the logical X error, i.e. X error on the first qubit
in the block. This immediately yields
I(X : Y ) = 1−
∑
~s
P˜ (~s)H2
(
P˜ (lx|~s)
)
, (12)
using the binary entropy H2(x) = −x log x− (1− x) log(1− x). Note that I(X : Y ) does not
depend on the particular values {puv} in σAB (see (3)), but only depends on the bit error
rate p = p10 + p11. The form of the mutual information indicates the advantage provided by
the syndrome. If Alice did not send any information, Bob’s state would be averaged over the
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possible syndromes, and the mutual information would involve the entropy of the average of
the P˜ (lx|~s) rather than the average of the entropies. By concavity of entropy, the latter rate
is larger.
To calculate the quantum mutual information between Alice and Eve, we trace out Bob’s
systems and obtain
σXE =
1
2
∑
x
[x]A ⊗ ρ(x)E1E2 , (13)
ρ
(x)
E1E2
=
∑
~u
p~u [~u]E1 ⊗ ρ(x),~uE2 , and (14)
ρ
(x),~u
E2
= (Z~ηm)x
∑
~f
q~fZ
~f |Ψ|~u〉〈Ψ|~u|Z ~f (Z~ηm)x, (15)
with
|Ψ|~u〉 =
∑
~v
√
p~v|~u|~v〉. (16)
We proceed with the computation of the secure key rate for the BB84 and the 6-state protocol
separately in the following two subsections.
2.1.1 BB84
To calculate the secure key rate we must find the minimum over all σAB of the difference
between the quantum mutual information between Alice and Bob and Alice and Eve. Since
I(X : Y ) does not depend on the particular structure of {puv} = {1 − 2p+ t, p− t, t, p− t},
t ∈ [0, p], in σAB, but only depends on the bit error rate p = p10 + p11, this corresponds to
finding the maximum of I(X : E).
Let us assume for a moment that this maximum is achieved for independent bit and phase
errors, i. e. we consider the state σAB with {puv} = {1− 2p+ t, p− t, t, p− t} and t = p2. In
this case |Ψ|~u〉 does not depend on ~u, and we get
ρ
(x),~u
E2
= (Z~ηm)xρ⊗mpq (Z
~ηm)x (17)
with ρpq = (1 − q)|ϕ+〉〈ϕ+| + q|ϕ−〉〈ϕ−| and |ϕ±〉 =
√
1− p|0〉 ± √p|1〉. Part E1 and E2
of the state ρ
(x)
E1E2
in (14) are now completely decoupled. As it was shown in [15], the
fact that E1 is classical allows the corresponding state describing dependent errors to be
reconstructed from this state: After tracing out the E1 part, we add an ancilla [0]E3 , apply
the isometry
∑
~u,~v
√
p~u|~v|~u〉E3〈0| ⊗ [~v]E2 and eventually dephase the ancilla. Since quantum
mutual information never increases under local operations, the maximum of I(X : E) is indeed
achieved for independent errors and we get
I(X : E) = S
(1
2
ρ⊗mpq +
1
2
(ZρpqZ)
⊗m)−mS(ρpq). (18)
Subtraction of (18) from (12) gives the secure key rate for the BB84 protocol:
r(m, p) = max
q
1
m
[
1−
m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
P˜ (s)H2
(
P˜ (lx|s)
)
− S(1
2
ρ⊗mpq +
1
2
(ZρpqZ)
⊗m)+mH2( 12 (1 +√1− 16p(1− p)q(1 − q)))]. (19)
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Fig. 3. Secure key rate r of BB84 for various types of preprocessing versus bit error rate p. No
preprocessing corresponds to rSP , noisy preprocessing to rm=1, and the maximum over all block
lengths m ≤ 250 to rmax, shown in red. For the rates achieved by the blocklengths m = 1 and
m = 250, the corresponding rate of the added noise is shown on the right y axis.
Omitting the maximization over q, the above formula gives the key rate rm,q(p) for some fixed
values of m and q as a function of the bit error rate p. By setting rm,q(p) equal to zero, we
find pmax(m, q), the maximum tolerable bit error rate for given m and q. For very high levels
of added noise, i. e. for q = 12 − ǫ, we find that for all values of m, the key rate becomes zero
at the bit error rate pmax(m, q =
1
2 − ǫ) = 12.4120%, but by adding less noise at higher values
of m, secret keys can be generated for even larger bit error rates.
Without the use of the cat code (i. e. if we take m = 1) the rate reduces to [11, 12]
r(p) = max
q
[
1−H2(p˜)−H2(p) +H2
(
1
2 (1 +
√
1− 16p(1− p)q(1− q))
)]
. (20)
With neither local randomization (q = 0) nor use of the cat code (m = 1) the key rate (20)
becomes even smaller [3],
r(p) = 1− 2H2(p), (21)
and secure key generation becomes impossible for bit error rates higher than pmax = 11.0028%.
Figure 3 shows plots of the key rates given by (21) and (20) (black) and the maximum
over the key rates given by (19) (red) for values of m up to 250. The increase of the maximal
tolerable bit error rate with the block length m is illustrated in figure 1. The highest value of
m for which we maximized the tolerable bit error rate as function of the added noise q was
m = 500 leading to pmax(m = 500, q = 0.32656) = 12.9379%.
By far the most difficult part in the numerical evaluation of (19) is computing the von
Neumann entropy, as it contains a sum of two m-fold tensor products of different one qubit
density operators. Such an expression can be more efficiently calculated by taking into account
its block diagonal structure which follows from permutation invariance, as detailed in the
Appendix.
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2.1.2 6-state
Since the set Γ only contains the single state {puv} = {1 − 32p, p2 , p2 , p2}, minimization over
σAB is unnecessary and the secure key rate is directly given by the difference of the quantum
mutual informations between Alice and Bob (12) and Alice and Eve. Despite the simplicity
of Γ, this calculation is more difficult than BB84 due to the correlation between bit and phase
errors. The corresponding conditional probabilities are given by pv=1|u=0 =
p
2(1−p) = p
′,
pv=0|u=0 = 1 − p′ and pv|u=1 = 12 . Therefore, denoting the number of ones in ~u as u and by
reordering the qubits in such a way that the first u qubits are the ones with ui = 1, we get
|Ψ|~u〉 =
∑
~v
√
p~v|~u|~v〉 = |+〉⊗u ⊗ |ϕ′+〉⊗m−u = |Ψ|u〉 (22)
with |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉) and |ϕ′±〉 =
√
p′|0〉 ± √1− p′|1〉, leading to
ρ
(x),u
E2
= (Z~ηm)x
∑
~f
q~fZ
~f [+]⊗u ⊗ [ϕ′+]⊗m−uZ ~f (Z~ηm)x
= (Z~ηm)xσ⊗u ⊗ γ⊗m−u(Z~ηm)x (23)
with σ = (1− q)[+] + q[−] and γ = (1− q)[ϕ′+] + q[ϕ′−]. Reordering the state in this manner
does not change the entropy, and so will not alter the rate. Using these results the quantum
mutual information between Alice and Eve can be expressed as
I(X : E) =
m∑
u=0
(
m
u
)
pu(1− p)m−u
[
S
(1
2
σ⊗u ⊗ γ⊗m−u + 1
2
(ZσZ)⊗u ⊗ (ZγZ)⊗m−u)
− uH2(q)− (m− u)H2
(
1
2 (1 +
√
1− 16p′(1− p′)q(1 − q))
)]
. (24)
Since σ and ZσZ are diagonal in the same basis we are able to write the von Neumann entropy
as
u∑
k=0
(
u
k
)
S
((1− q)kqu−k
2
γ⊗m−u +
qk(1 − q)
2
u−k
(ZγZ)⊗m−u
)
(25)
which is of the same form as the von Neumann entropy in (18). Therefore the same methods
for evaluation can be applied; see the Appendix.
The secure key rate is given by subtracting (24) from (12),
r(m, p) = max
q
1
m
[
1−
m−1∑
s=0
(
m− 1
s
)
P˜ (s)H2
(
P˜ (lx|s)
)
− I(X : E)
]
. (26)
As it is the case for the BB84 protocol, the key rate becomes zero for all values of m for q → 12
(this time at bit error rate pmax(m, q =
1
2 − ǫ) = 14.1119%), but again adding less noise at
higher values of m gives rise to secret keys for even higher bit error rates.
Two special cases emerge from (26), m = 1:
r(p) = max
q
[
1−H2(p˜)−
∑
u
pu
(
H2
(
pv|u
)−H2( 12 (1 +√1− 16p1|u(1− p1|u)q(1 − q))))],
(27)
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and q = 0, which leads to [8, 9, 4]:
r(p) =
1
m
[
1−
∑
~s
P (~s)H(P (lx, lz|~s)
]
(28)
(note the appearance of the usual entropy, not the binary entropy), with
P (lx, lz, ~s) =
1
2
[
pl
x(m−2s)+s(1− p)(1−lx)(m−2s)+s+
δ0,lx(m−2s)+s (−1)l
z
(1 − 2p)(1−lx)(m−2s)+s
]
(29)
which attains the highest robustness for m = 5 leading to pmax(m = 5, q = 0) = 12.6904%
instead of pmax(m = 1, q = 0) = 12.6193%.
a.
In figure 4 we show the key rates in these special cases as well as the general case for optimal
noise and blocklengths up to m = 125. Included are q = 0,m = 1 (black), q = 0,m = 5
(dotted), and m = 1 for the optimal q (black). The maximum over the key rates given by
(26) for values of m up to 125 is shown in red, along with the specific case of m = 125. The
increase of the maximal tolerable bit error rate with the block length m is illustrated in figure
1. The highest value of m for which we maximized the tolerable bit error rate as function of
the added noise q was m = 250 leading to pmax(m = 250, q = 0.31210) = 14.5741%. Since
the computation for larger blocksizes becomes rather slow, we extrapolated the value for the
optimum noise leading to q ≈ 0.31650 for m = 300. By calculating the highest tolerable
bit error for this value of noise we get the best lower bound pmax(m = 300, q = 0.31650) =
14.5930%.
3 Iterated Preprocessing
By combining local randomization with the cat-code of size m, Alice and Bob gain an advan-
tage over Eve and intuitively it seems this advantage might be even bigger by performing the
procedure twice. In this section we discuss such a twofold iterated protocol where Alice adds
noise at a rate q to m2 blocks of size m1 each, and then after measuring the syndromes of
these blocks, adds further noise at another rate Q to the m2 ’key’ bits of these blocks. Then
the syndrome of these m2 bits is measured and the remainder of the protocol proceeds as
usual. We restrict ourselves to the BB84 protocol for simplicity. Using essentially the same
argument as in section 2.1.1, we find that we only need to consider independent bit and phase
errors described by the state σAB with {puv} = {1 − 2p + t, p − t, t, p − t} and t = p2: (i)
I(X : Y ) depends only on the bit error rate p = p10 + p11, (ii) therefore we have to find the
maximum of I(X : E), (iii) which is achieved for independent errors. The proof of (iii) works
as in section 2.1.1, since, as we will see, E1 of σXE is again classical.
aNote that in [8, 9] the quantity under consideration was the capacity of the quantum depolarizing channel
with {puv} = {1− p,
p
3
,
p
3
,
p
3
} therefore leading to pmax =
3
2
× 12.6904%
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Fig. 4. Secure key rate r of the 6-state protocol for various types of preprocessing versus bit error
rate p. No preprocessing corresponds to rLo, noisy preprocessing to rm=1, and the maximum
achievable rate over all blocklengths m ≤ 125, to rmax, shown in red. For the rates achieved
by the blocklengths m = 1 and m = 125, the corresponding rate of the added noise is shown on
the right y-axis. The dotted rate with pmax = 12.6904% is due to Lo, corresponding to use of a
repetition code of blocklength m = 5 and no noisy preprocessing.
3.1 Rate Calculation
We start with (9), now denoting m as m1. Adding additional noise at rate Q to the key bit
the state is described as
|σ′〉ABE =
∑
~f,~u,~v
∑
F
√
p~u,~vq~f QFX
~ξm1 ·(~u+~f)+F
B Z
~ηm1 ·~v
B |Φ+〉AB
⊗ |~u〉E1(Z~ηm1 )FZ
~f |~v〉E2 |~s 〉B|~f 〉A′ |F 〉A′′ (30)
with classical registers B, A′ and A′′ and the same relationship ~s = (~ξ1 · (~u+ ~f), . . . , ~ξm1−1 ·
(~u + ~f)) as before. Now we consider the m2-fold tensor product |σ〉
′⊗m2
ABE and define the
abbreviations ~U = (~ξm1 · (~u1 + ~f1), . . . , ~ξm1 · (~um2 + ~fm2)) and ~V = (~ηm1 · ~v1, . . . , ~ηm1 · ~vm2).
Again Alice and Bob both measure their stabilizers, Alice sends her result to Bob, who
calculates the relative syndrome ~S = (~ξ1 · (~U + ~F ), . . . , ~ξm2−1 · (~U + ~F )). Both then measure
their key bit. The tripartite semiclassical state describing the correlations is now given by
σXY E =
1
2
∑
~F
Q~F
∑
~f1,..., ~fm2
q~f1 . . . q~fm2
∑
~u1,...,~um2
p~u1 . . . p~um2
×
∑
x
[x]A ⊗ [x+ Lx]B ⊗ [~s1, . . . , ~sm2 , ~S]B ⊗ [~u1, . . . , ~um2 ]E1
⊗ (Z⊗m1m2)x
m2⊗
i=1
(
(Z⊗m1)FiZ
~fi |Ψ〉〈Ψ|Z ~fi(Z⊗m1)Fi)(Z⊗m1m2)x, (31)
where |Ψ〉 = ∑~v√p~v|~v〉 and ~si = (~ξ1 · (~ui + ~fi), . . . ), ~S = (~ξ1 · (~U + ~F ), . . . ), and Lx =
~ξm2 · (~U + ~F ).
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To calculate the quantum mutual information between Alice and Bob we trace out Eve’s
systems and obtain
σXY =
1
2
∑
~F
Q~F
∑
~u1...~um2
p˜~u1 . . . p˜~um2
∑
x
[x]A ⊗ [x+ Lx]B ⊗ [~s1 . . . ~sm2 , ~S]B, (32)
using p˜ = p(1−q)+(1−p)q. Since Alice’s additional noise ~f is now combined with Eve’s noise
~u, ~f no longer appears in the the syndromes ~si and ~S: ~si = (~ξ1 ·~ui, . . . ), ~S = (~ξ1 ·(~U ′+ ~F ), . . . ).
Additionally, Lx is now Lx = ~ξm2 · (~U ′ + ~F ), with ~U ′ = (~ξm1 · ~u1, . . . , ~ξm1 · ~um2). The mutual
information can therefore be written as
I(X : Y ) = 1−
∑
~s1...~sm2 ,
~S
P˜ ′(~s1 . . . ~sm2 , ~S)H2
(
P˜ ′(Lx|~s1 . . . ~sm2 , ~S)
)
, (33)
where the probability distribution P˜ ′ only depends on the number of ones in each of the
syndromes ~si and ~S (we assume that the zeros and ones in ~S are ordered such that the
syndromes ~si, i ∈ {1, . . . ,m2 − S}, correspond to Si = 0):
P˜ ′(Lx = 0, s1 . . . sm2 , S) =
m2−S∏
i=1
[(1 − p˜)m1−si p˜si(1 −Q) + (1− p˜)si p˜m1−siQ]×
m2∏
i=m2−S+1
[(1− p˜)si p˜m1−si(1−Q) + (1− p˜)m1−si p˜siQ]. (34)
In addition we see from (34) that for a given value of S only the frequency distribution of the
si, i ∈ {1, . . . ,m2−S}, and the sj , j ∈ {m2− S+1, . . . ,m2}, matters. This fact can be used
to speed up the calculation of the sum over the syndromes in (33).
Since ρ
(x),~u
E2
= (Z⊗m1m2)x
[
(1 − Q)ρ⊗m1pq + Q(ZρpqZ)⊗m1
]⊗m2
(Z⊗m1m2)x, the mutual in-
formation between Alice and Eve can be seen to be
I(X : E) = S
(1
2
[
(1−Q)ρ⊗m1pq +Q(ZρpqZ)⊗m1
]⊗m2
+
1
2
[
Qρ⊗m1pq +(1−Q)(ZρpqZ)⊗m1
]⊗m2)
−m2S
(
(1−Q)ρ⊗m1pq +Q(ZρpqZ)⊗m1
)
(35)
Once more the secure key rate is given by the difference of these mutual informations,
r(m1,m2, p) = max
q,Q
1
m1m2
(
I(X : Y )− I(X : E)). (36)
Again the hardest part in the numerical evaluation of (36) comes from the von Neumann
entropies. One contains a sum of two m2-fold tensor products of different density operators,
but this time these density operators are m1-qubit density operators. Such an expression
can also be calculated more efficiently by taking into account its permutation invariance. For
more details see the Appendix.
We compare the resulting key rate of the m1×m2 = 3×3 iterated code with the key rates
of the non-iterated codes of blocksizes m ∈ {9, 10, 11} in figure 5.
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Fig. 5. Secure key rate r of BB84 with iterated preprocessing of size m1 ×m2 = 3× 3 versus bit
error rate p. The right y-axis shows the corresponding values of added noise in the first (q) and
second iteration (Q) as well as values of the total amount of added noise (qtot = q(1−Q)+(1−q)Q,
red). For comparison, the rates of the non-iterated protocol are shown for blocksizesm ∈ {9, 10, 11}
(dashed lines). The corresponding values of added noise for these cases are also shown (dash-dot
lines).
4 Conclusions
Although sending quantum information and establishing a secret key are not equivalent uses
of a quantum channel, their similarities are enough to ensure a fruitful exchange of techniques
between the two problems. Here we have extended the application of structured codes to the
problem of QKD given in [15] to the 6-state protocol, showing how preprocessing based on
both structured codes and local randomization leads to higher tolerable error rates. Having
one more unbiased basis implies correlation between bit and phase errors of the estimated
quantum state, leading to increased robustness of the protocol. Indeed, it seems likely that
for large blocklength (m ≈ 500) the threshold of the 6-state protocol exceeds the lowest
known upper bound on the threshold for the BB84 protocol (14.6447%). This method of
preprocessing does not close the gap between BB84 upper and lower bounds, however, as
the available data suggests that the BB84 threshold never exceeds roughly 13% even for
asymptotically-long blocks. For the 6-state protocol, more data is needed to draw even a
partial conclusion on the asymptotic threshold.
Additionally, we have shown that further performance gains are possible when iterating
the preprocessing step. Although our results are confined to two rounds with small block
sizes, we can nevertheless already observe some general properties. The entire rate curve
shifts to higher values, so this type of processing might be useful in increasing the efficiency
of protocols running over noisy channels. Intriguingly, the total amount of noise added to
the sifted key bits is essentially the same as in the case of one round, showing that the
improvement comes from making better use of the same amount of noise. More sophisticated
representation-theoretic methods, in particular a Clebsch-Gordon decomposition of the states
input to the second preprocessing round, should make analysis of more rounds and larger
blocksizes tractable.
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Fig. 6. The concatenated code of size m1 = 4 and m2 = 3 encoding one qubit into n = m1 ×m2.
The operators on the left hand side are the Z(~ξi) = Z
~ξi , those on the right hand side the X(~ηi) =
X~ηi . The stabilizers are within the dotted line, the normalizers within the dashed one.
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Appendix A
Efficient computation of the key rates
To evaluate the secure key rate of the BB84 and the 6-state quantum key distribution protocols
involving our preprocessing protocol, we need to compute the von Neumann entropy of a linear
combination of m-fold tensor products of different one-qubit density matrices, S(αρ⊗m +
βσ⊗m). In the case of the iterated preprocessing protocol this expression becomes a sum
over m2-fold tensor products of some qudit density matrices of dimension d = 2
m1 . In this
appendix we discuss how such expressions can be evaluated efficiently by using the Schur
transform, following the presentation in [20].
Considering m qudits of dimension d, the Schur transform is a unitary transformation re-
lating the standard computational basis {|i1, . . . im〉}, ij = 0, 1, . . . , d−1, to a basis associated
with the representation theory of the symmetric and general linear groups,
|λ〉|pλ〉|qλ〉 =
∑
i1...im
[USch]
λpλqλ
i1...im
|i1, . . . , im〉. (A.1)
The new basis {|λ〉|pλ〉|qλ〉} is labeled by a Young diagram λ denoting the irreducible repre-
sentations of both Sm and GLd, a Young tableau pλ labeling the basis vectors spanning the
representation spaces of Sm, and a Weyl tableau qλ labeling the the basis vectors spanning
the representation spaces of GLd. Elements σ ∈ GLd and s ∈ Sm transform the basis states
according to
σ⊗m|λ〉|pλ〉|qλ〉 = |λ〉|pλ〉 (σλ|qλ〉), (A.2)
s |λ〉|pλ〉|qλ〉 = |λ〉 (sλ|pλ〉) |qλ〉, (A.3)
whereas σλ denotes σ
⊗m in the irrep λ and sλ denotes s in the irrep λ.
It then follows that states like ρ⊗m are block-diagonal, with blocks labeled by a Young
diagram and tableau (λ, pλ). Blocks with the same Young diagram are identical, and the
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number of Young tableaux NY (λ) specifies degeneracy. Meanwhile, the dimension of the
blocks is given by the corresponding number of Weyl tableaux NW (λ).
This structure is clearly helpful for the calculation of expressions like S(αρ⊗m + βσ⊗m).
The entropy of the state reduces to the sum of entropies of the blocks, which itself factors
into the entropy for a block (λ, pλ) with a fixed Young tableau pλ, say the first one, times the
corresponding degeneracy NY (λ).
For d > 2 we explicitly calculate both the ρλ and the σλ blocks using (A.1), e. g.
(ρλ)Qq = 〈Qλ|〈pλ|〈λ|ρ⊗m|λ〉|pλ〉|qλ〉 =∑
j1...jm
∑
i1...im
[U∗Sch]
λpλQλ
j1...jm
[USch]
λpλqλ
i1...im
〈j1, . . . , jm|ρ⊗m|i1, . . . , im〉.
The Schur transform itself can be obtained using e. g. the eigenfunction method [20]. For
the iterated protocol it may be possible to further streamline the calculation by taking into
account the fact that the qudit inputs to the second round are themselves block-diagonal.
Computations for much larger blocksizes m1 ×m2 may then become feasible.
For d = 2 things are simpler, as Young diagrams λ consist of at most two rows and can
be labeled by an index j, where 2j is the number of columns consisting of one row only
(j = 0 . . . m2 if m is even, j =
1
2 . . .
m
2 if m is odd).
j
l
λ= . . .
. . .
m
2 − j  2j 
The dimension of an irreducible representation with label j is NW (j) = 2j + 1 and the Weyl
tableaux are now labeled k = −j, . . . , j, whereas j+ k denotes the number of ones in the first
row of the Weyl tableaux:
0 0
1 1
. . . 0 0 0 0
1 1
. . . 1 1
j − k{ j + k{
m
2 − j  2j 
The corresponding degeneracy follows from Robinson’s hook length formula, which in this
case yields
NY (j) =
(
m
m/2− j
)
2j + 1
m/2 + j + 1
. (A.4)
We diagonalize ρ and σ, denoting the two eigenvalues of ρ [σ] as ρ1 and ρ2 [σ1 and σ2],
ρ = Uρ̺U
†
ρ , ̺ = diag{ρ1, ρ2},
σ = UσςU
†
σ, ς = diag{σ1, σ2},
and note that diagonal density operators like ̺ and ς can easily be expressed in the j-th
representation, since they are diagonal in all these representations, too. The action of ̺⊗m
on basis states (A.1) of the Schur basis becomes simply a multiplication by powers of the two
eigenvalues because of the symmetry properties of these basis states: Each basis state of the
Schur basis labeled by a certain Young diagram j and Weyl tableaux k consists of a superpo-
sition of computational basis states which are permutations of |01〉⊗(m/2−j)|0〉⊗(j−k)|1〉⊗(j+k)
independently of the Young tableaux (specifying degeneracy). We obtain
̺j = diag{ρj−k1 ρj+k2 (ρ1ρ2)m/2−j}k=−j...j , (A.5)
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and an analogous expression for ςj . To get the non-diagonal original block ρj [σj ] we have to
apply the unitary Uρ [Uσ] in the irrep j which is given by the Wigner rotation matricesDj(Uρ)
[Dj(Uσ)]. In our case these Wigner matrices are given simply by matrix exponentiation,
Dj(Uρ) = exp(− θ(ρ)2 (J+−J−)), where θ(ρ) denotes a phase calculated from ρ, and J± denotes
the usual angular momentum ladder operators, J±|jm〉 =
√
j(j + 1) +m(m± 1)|jm± 1〉. In
this way it becomes feasible to calculate expressions like S(ασ⊗m+βρ⊗m) for values of m up
to several hundreds.
